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There are as many interpretations of the recent Russian crisis as there are varieties of caviar.
George Soros argues that the recent rash of national currency crises is the result of an inherent
instability in financial markets.  The official Russian government version is much the same  - the
ruble fell victim to the excessive pessimism of investors still overreacting to the shock of the Asian
financial crisis.  The week before the Russian devaluation and announcement of a debt moratorium
(i.e. partial default), Prime Minister Sergei Kirigenko argued there were no concrete reasons for the
behavior of the currency and financial markets, just psychological ones.
By then Kirigenko was right that psychology had become important: an element of panic
had set in. Markets had almost completely lost confidence in the ability of the Russian government
and banking system to honor their short-term debts.  This pessimism, feeding on itself, assured that
investors' worst fears would be realized: Russia did fall victim to self-fulfilling speculative
expectations. But as in the other major currency crises of the 1990's - the European Monetary
System in 1992 and 1993, Mexico in 1994, South East Asia in 1997 and Brazil in 1999 - these
speculative attacks did not come out of the blue. There were sound economic reasons. Once a
speculative crisis gets underway financial markets do often overreact, with optimism turning to
excessive pessimism. But such market dynamics only account for some of the details of the
Russian crisis, not the basic cause.
The market may have gone too far when it pushed up the interest rates on short term ruble
denominated Russian government debt to over 200 per cent; but in truth a substantial rise in interest
rates was quite justified in order to reflect the genuine riskiness of ruble assets generated by the
underlying economic and financial conditions.
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This essay traces out some of the key developments that led to the Russian crisis and
highlights the strong similarities to the other major currency crises of the 1990s. The primary
causes were neither the instabilities of the international financial markets nor the bail out policies
of the International Monetary Fund (as charged by critics of the left and the right respectively).
They are found rather in the forces of domestic political economy and the technical difficulties of
operating regimes of pegged exchange rates.  In a world of high international capital mobility
countries face a starker choice between the extremes of genuinely fixed and flexible exchange
rates.  The compromise of adjustably pegged rates, so often used in the past, doesn’t work now that
billions of dollars can cross national borders in a few hours.  Rather than stabilizing markets, such
pegged rate regimes have become a recipe for crisis.  Fixed exchange rates in the form of a
common currency or a currency board make sense for some countries, but most will find that some
form of flexible rate regime is their best option.
The strategy of attempting to foster economic reform efforts in Russia through the provision
of "conditional" international financial assistance clearly failed, but this was a calculated gamble
that was likely well worth the risks. The costs of a less reformist, more nationalistic Russia are
huge - both to the welfare of the Russian people and to global security. Thus on both humanitarian
and national security grounds, Western financial support was justified. Even though it was clear
that the chances of success were much lower than for the post World War II Marshall plan, we had
to try. The mistake was that for domestic political reasons Western governments forced the IMF
into being the primary vehicle for such a risky investment. As a result of the failure of this strategy
the credibility of the IMF's stabilization programs (already seriously eroded) has been further
damaged.  Thus the Russian crisis points to important reforms that are needed now to strengthen
the IMF.4
Pessimists view the recent series of currency and financial crashes around the globe as signs
of impending global financial collapse.  Our crystal ball shows a sunnier outlook.  The widespread
abandonment of pegged exchange rates, in the wake of recent crises, is encouraging.  Flexible
exchange rates are no substitute for the tough reforms needed to lay the foundations for sound
economic and financial infrastructures and replace cronyism with competition.  But flexible rates
will guard against some of the worst consequences of bad economic policy.  This damage control
role of flexible rates is far from glamorous but, in an imperfect world, it is invaluable.
Blaming Financial Liberalization Misses the Point
It’s hard to remember that only a few years ago financial liberalization was the rage around
the globe.  In the wake of the recent crisis, there has been a dramatic change in attitudes.  A chorus
of cries to increase national and international regulation of international capital flows is now being
heard.  There is no question that some of the financial liberalization of the past decade was
premature.  Advocates often paid too little attention to the preconditions necessary for liberalized
markets to work well.  There is a vast difference between liberalizing competitive markets peopled
by well trained managers and staff and liberalizing markets still dominated by monopoly elements
and staffed by inexperienced personnel.  Today, however, there appears to be a serious danger that
the pendulum is swinging back too far.  It was not inherent flaws in the behavior of financial
markets than caused the recent crisis, although flaws did increase their severity.
There are costs as well as benefits to most policies.  What financial market liberalization
does is increase the benefits of good economic policies and the costs of bad policies.  And bad
policies include not only the lax monetary and fiscal policies of the traditional high inflation crisis
episodes, but also the harder to spot problems of poorly structured banking and financial systems
and cronyism in the allocation of credit.  No wonder then that officials from countries with poor5
economic policies frequently try to deflect the spotlight onto those perennial villains - the greedy
speculators.
What makes analysis of this issue so tricky is that international financial markets have not
behaved according to the cool, calculating standards of mainstream economic theory. They have at
times shown distressing tendencies toward herd behavior and panic. And the critics are quite right
that liberalization must be implemented with care. Where government policies still create perverse
incentives the liberalization of markets will often make matters worse. This was clearly illustrated
in the recent Asian crisis where many local banks and businesses borrowed excessively from
abroad because they believed that their national governments would protect them from the effects
of devaluation.  In Russia, the combination of liberalization with perverse economic incentives was
if anything, even worse.  Clearly the proper sequence of reform is to first create proper economic
infrastructure of accounting and managerial practices and a competitive environment and then
liberalize capital flows. The Asian crisis was replayed in Russia, not because financial markets
never learn, but because once again domestic financial actors believed that they had the political
clout to get the government to bail them out if their investments went south.
That is just what was done by the big Russian banks. They borrowed like mad to purchase
high yielding Russian government securities. When interest rates soared in the wake of the Duma's
nixing of the reform program, the resulting collapse of bond prices threatened the solvency of a
number of these banks.  When these financial oligarchs learned that the government planned to let
their institutions go bankrupt, they successfully lobbied Mr. Yeltsin to fire Mr. Kirigenko and his
cabinet and nominate Mr. Crony Capitalism himself, Viktor Chernomirdin, as Prime Minister.
Market liberalization in the face of the special interest problems of crony capitalism can be quite
costly. But the fundamental problem is the crony capitalism, not free markets.6
What the critics of financial market liberalization often miss is that far from being too ready
to generate crisis, international investors have tended to be gullible and wait too long to react to
worsening economic conditions. True, once crises have hit, financial markets have frequently
overreacted. But seldom, if ever, have the markets been the cause of unjustified speculative attacks.
Recent developments in international monetary theory have focused on the possibilities of self
fulfilling speculative attacks, and the crises of the nineties have included several instances where
such behavior may have occurred, including both the crisis of the European Monetary System in
1993 and the recent Russian crisis.  But self-fulfilling speculative attacks need not be unjustified
attacks. The first generation of speculative attack models saw a world of black and white. Either the
underlying fundamentals were sound or they were not. As soon as the situation changed from the
first to the second category, a successful speculative attack would immediately be launched. The
latest generation of speculative attack models is much more realistic. They recognize shades of
gray. A country's fundamentals may be so strong that no speculative attack is justified even in the
face of typical adverse developments. On the other hand, a country may be so clearly headed for
trouble that the only question is when the speculative attack will come. But between these poles is a
third category in which a country has allowed its underlying fundamentals to slip into a zone of
vulnerability.
In this zone, a crisis isn't inevitable if good luck holds, but the country is quite vulnerable to
adverse shocks such as political assassinations as in the case of the Mexican peso, pegging to a
strengthening currency as in the case of the Thai baht, a slump in the price of a major export, as
was the case for Russia with oil, or even a speculative crisis in a neighboring country, as happened
to Indonesia after the fall of the Thai baht. Normal swings in the degree of optimism or pessimism
of investors can be a similar source of shock. There is no question that the Asian crisis caused a
substantial swing in investors attitudes toward emerging markets. Burnt badly in Mexico and then7
again in South East Asia, the risk premium investors demanded on all emerging markets debt rose
substantially. This was as little Russia's fault as was the fall of oil prices. But this was not the result
of irrational panic in the global financial markets.
Panic eventually did hit the Russian market, but this was only after the crisis was already in
full swing. The Russian government's fault was that it had allowed the underlying economic
situation to deteriorate to a position of substantial vulnerability. In such a situation negative
developments tend to feed on themselves and suddenly a level of maturing debt that would have
been easy to roll over a month before becomes problematic.  The Russian default in turn set off a
flight for quality and substantially raised the cost of borrowing for emerging markets across the
globe.
How did Russia fall into this position of vulnerability? The story is sad because despite only
half hearted efforts at tax reform and combating crony capitalism, Russia had made enormous
economic progress, especially in getting inflation under control.  In 1992 inflation rose to over
1,500 percent.  By 1996, it had been brought down under 100 percent, in 1997 to under 20 percent,
and in early 1998, down to the single digit range.
The crises of the nineties illustrate a number of empirical points. One is that inflation is not
the only cause of weak currencies and balance of payments crises. Indeed, contrary to previous
experience, none of the major crisis countries of the 1990s were suffering from high inflation. The
monetary approach to balance of payments analysis is quite correct in stressing that excessive rates
of money growth are a sure way to currency crisis, but it does not follow that the absence of
excessive money approach will assure balance of payments stability. There are a number of other
factors such as capital flows and commodity market developments that can enter the picture. In the
case of Russia, the fall in oil prices caused a drop in export proceeds between the first half of 1997
and the first half of 1998 of more than $15 billion at an annual rate. That is a substantial shock that8
required a midsized adjustment in the exchange rate to compensate. However, Russia, like Mexico,
had been following a strategy of using its exchange rate peg as an instrument to control domestic
inflation rather than to adjust its balance of payments. Such exchange rate based stabilization
policies were popularized by the apparent success of the members of the European Monetary
System in conquering inflation during the 1980s.  They were subsequently urged on a broad range
of emerging market economies by a number of Western European governments, many academic
economists, and at times, the IMF. This strategy of using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for
domestic prices does sometimes work. Argentina, Estonia, and France are all examples. But recent
experience has made clear that it is a high risk strategy.
The Dangers of Pegged Exchange Rates
The reason is not hard to understand. A basic tenet of international monetary theory is that
in the long run it is not possible to maintain simultaneously a pegged exchange rate, freedom from
controls on trade and capital flows, and independence of domestic macroeconomic policy. This is
often labeled "the unholy trinity". What makes the simple logic of this proposition difficult for
policy makers to sometimes grasp is the proviso, in the long run. In the short run, these objectives
will not always be in conflict and this can lead officials to forget about this fundamental long run
constraint. This oversight was a major cause of the EMS crises of the early 1990s.
The pegged rate strategy will work as long as policy makers are willing to adjust domestic
policies as necessary to protect the currency. Indeed this is the purpose of using the exchange rate
to discipline domestic policies. There are two basic problems with the strategy, however, and both
are vividly illustrated in the ruble crisis. First, the cause of balance of payments problems may not
be related to domestic macroeconomic policies. That was the case for Russia with the fall in oil
price. The approximate economic response to this type of shock is an adjustment of the exchange
rate, not a deflation of the domestic economy.9
Secondly, even where domestic policy adjustments are the appropriate response,
commitment to maintaining the peg may not be sufficient to induce the needed domestic policy
response. This was the case with the Duma's unwillingness to accept the stabilization program
agreed to by the IMF and the Russia's Executive Branch. Typically when the discipline effects of
pegged rates fail to be sufficient, the result is a currency crisis that undermines much of the
progress made toward stabilization. This was the case with the Mexico peso. It is being repeated in
Russia. Where the domestic political forces for stabilization are strong, use of an exchange rate
linked anti inflation strategy can sometimes help provide better results, but where domestic support
is weak, then efforts to use exchange rate policy as a source of discipline are likely to backfire.
The recent crises also highlight the basic difficulties of effectively implementing a strategy
of adjustably pegged exchange rates in a world of high capital mobility. One of the reasons
economics is appropriately labeled the dismal science is that economists focus on the costs as well
as benefits of policies.  There are few policies, no matter how impressive their cost-benefit ratios,
that do not bear costs. Exchange rate policy is an important case in point. Fixed exchange rates are
typically good for international trade but constrain domestic macroeconomic policies. Flexible
exchange rates are often less attractive for international trade but allow greater domestic
macroeconomic freedom. Governments typically do not like to have to make stark choices.  For
understandable reasons they prefer to avoid the extremes of both fixed and floating exchange rates
and try to find some compromise that maximizes benefits relative to costs.
The idea of the adjustable peg, on which the post war international monetary system
negotiated at Bretton Woods was based, was just such a compromise. Exchange rates would
normally be pegged, but in extreme circumstances of fundamental disequilibrium could be adjusted
instead of forcing domestic macroeconomic policies to generate domestic inflation or deflation.
The problem is that if pegs are not adjusted frequently then disequilibrium builds up and10
speculators have a field day.  The only question is whether the peg will be adjusted, not in which in
direction will it move. This is heaven for the Soroses of the world.
The higher is international capital mobility, the greater are the difficulties of operating such
compromise systems because of this one way speculative option.  Among the industrial countries,
international capital mobility had already risen sufficiently by the late 1960s to begin the process
which led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods adjustable peg in the early 1970s. In the 1990s
capital mobility has risen to this level for many of the emerging market economies as well.
High capital mobility does not tilt the balance of cost-benefit calculation strongly in the
direction of either fixed or flexible exchange rates, but it makes it hard for countries to operate
compromise systems. Even with high capital mobility, it is possible for compromise systems to
operate without crises if pegs are adjusted sufficiently frequently and are accompanied by
reasonably wide bands around their central parties. Indeed, a few countries such as Chile, Hungary
and Poland have used such strategies quite successfully, as did members of the European Monetary
System during the first half of the 1980s.
Experience shows that it is difficult for governments to continue to operate such regimes
with sufficient flexibility, however. Over time, there is a strong tendency for such adjustable pegs
to evolve into more rigid regimes. The problem, as much political as economic, is that countries
face short-term incentives to postpone adjustments in hopes that they wouldn't prove to be needed
after all or can be deferred until a less politically sensitive time - such as after the next election.
Thus such compromise regimes tend to become more rigid over time and hence more prone to
crisis. This is just what happened with the operation of the European Monetary System as it
evolved from frequent parity adjustments in its early days to a rigidity that led to crisis in the early
1990s.11
This likewise helps explain the Russian government's hesitancy to adopt a moderate
devaluation to offset the effects of the oil price decline and the Brazilian government’s failure to
include a much needed devaluation as a part of its fall 1998 IMF program. And is so often the case,
the dynamics of the defense of the pegged rate locked the government into a process that made the
devaluation much more destabilizing when it eventually came. In attempting to convince the
market that devaluation would not occur, Russian officials followed the common pattern of
strongly denying that they were considering devaluation, arguing that it wouldn't solve the basic
problems and would have catastrophic effects on confidence. Its no wonder then that the
devaluation - especially when coupled with the forcing out of office of the economic reform team
and numerous signs of weakness on the part of Mr. Yeltsin - served to panic rather than calm the
markets. The arguments by top Russian officials against devaluation sadly turned out to be self-
fulfilling prophecies.
Currency Boards to the Rescue?
The decreased effectiveness of compromise exchange rate regimes in the face of high
capital mobility is one of the factors underlying the resurgence of interest in currency boards.  They
are essentially a strong form of fixed exchange rates under which the government gives up control
of domestic monetary policy. Once common among British colonies, currency boards had been out
of fashion for some time (Hong Kong being a prominent exception). Then in the 1990s a revival
began.  In recent years, Argentina, Bulgaria, Estonia, and Lithuania have all adopted currency
boards, in some cases quite successfully. They have become the policy of recommendation for
Wall Street Journal editorials.  They became a major source of concern in the official international
financial community when the idea was flirted with by President Suharto during the Indonesian
crisis. There have also been a number of calls that with the failure of its pegged rate real plan,
Brazil should replace its current float with a currency board.12
Currency board enthusiasts have been calling for a currency board for Russia for years and
this was seconded by George Soros in his famous letter to the Financial Times in August 1998 that
some have seen as the spark that ignited the crisis.  Soros called for a substantial devaluation of the
ruble to be followed by the establishment of a currency board. These ideas were taken quite
seriously by the government team formed Mr. Chernomirdin during the brief period before his
name was withdrawn in the face of two and a probable third refusal by the Duma to confirm his
appointment.  Interestingly, one popular version of the currency board proposal called for an initial
huge monetary expansion to pay back wages, euphemistically labeled a controlled monetary
emersion, to be followed by strict discipline under a currency board. The credibility of this print
now, sober up later strategy would obviously have been the subject of some doubt.
Currency boards are not just a fad. They are one of the most effective forms of fixed
exchange rates. Where their strongest backers go astray is in recommending them for all countries.
While there are costs and benefits to both fixed and flexible exchange rates, these cost-benefit
ratios vary systematically across countries. One of the most important developments in post war
international monetary analysis, pioneered by Robert Mundell, is the theory of optimum currency
areas.
1  This approach lays out the major factors which influence these cost-benefit ratios and make
it desirable for some countries to choose fixed rates and other to choose flexible ones. Many of
these criteria are complex and difficult to make operational, but one of the most important is
economic size. The intuition is straightforward. Under fixed rates the domestic economy must
adjust to its international sector while under flexible rates the international sector must adjust to the
domestic economy. The larger the economy, the less dependent on international trade it tends to be.
                                               
1 For discussion of this concept and its applications see the analysis and references in Paul Masson and Mark Taylor,
eds., Policy Issues in the Operation of Currency Unions, (Cambridge University Press, 1993) and Richard J. Sweeney,
Clas Wihlborg and Thomas D. Willett, eds. Exchange Rate Policies for Emerging Market Economies (Westview Press,
1999).13
Thus for a large economy like the United States, flexible exchange rates make sense, while for a
small economy like Luxembourg or Estonia fixed exchange rates are more appropriate. Economists
often disagree over just where the dividing line should be drawn - for example, Austria has found
fixed rates to work well for it while its similar sized neighbor - Switzerland - has continued to opt
for a flexible rate. But despite the existence of such (quite sizable) gray areas, the large size and
limited international trade ratios of Brazil, Indonesia and Russia clearly put them on the flexible
rate end of the spectrum.
Soros is right that Russia desperately needs financial discipline. But, the discipline effects
of pegged rates and IMF program didn't work in Russia. There must be sufficient domestic support
for such external discipline to work. Sadly Russia is not close to that stage. Nor for a large size
economy like Russia would a fixed exchange rate be the most effective mechanism by which to
attempt to impose discipline. For such economies, efforts to impose discipline must focus primarily
on domestic institutions. Even under currency boards there are ways to cheat and with the current
political situation in Russia there is little question that this is just what would happen. Institutional
reforms like balanced budgets, central bank independence, currency boards etc. can give substantial
tilts to the operation of political processes.  Thus over a sizeable range of political conditions they
can have a major impact on policy outcomes. But there are limits to their power and until the views
of a substantial proportion of the members of the Russian Parliament are drastically changed -
through elections or ideological conversion - there is little chance that the adoption of a currency
board would be any more effective in imposing discipline on Russian budgetary policies than was
the pegged rate regime in operation prior to the crisis.
The Limits of External Discipline
New York Times columnist Michael Weinstein made the interesting argument that
"devaluation...could serve as a clever device by which the Government puts pressure on an14
obstinate Parliament to provide economic reform package" (August 20, 1998, D2). While there is
some hope that this may work for Brazil, the reverse was sadly the case for Russia. The Communist
controlled Duma, instead of recognizing the need for fiscal reform, blamed the crisis on Mr.
Yeltsin's government and called for his resignation. During the period over which the terms of the
debt moratorium were supposedly being worked out, Mr. Yeltsin responded to this domestic
political challenges by firing his whole cabinet and bringing back Viktor Chernomyrdin as Prime
Minister.
But even Mr. Chernomyrdin was too reformist for the Duma.  The prospect of a third defeat
of Mr. Chernomyrdin's nomination, which would have triggered new elections, led Mr. Yeltsin to
nominate instead his Foreign Minister Yevgeny M. Prinakov.  With no substantive economic
background himself, Mr. Prinakov was induced to agree to an economic team dominated by anti-
reform officials.  The chief economic minister was a former head of Gosplan, the state planning
agency in the days of the Soviet Union.  Perhaps the most telling sign of the plummeting political
fortunes of reformers in the Russian government was the reappointment of Viktor Gerashchenko as
head of the Central Bank.  Mr. Gerashchenko had presided over Russia's quadruple digit inflation
of the early 1990s.  Famous for his denial of any connection between his printing presses and
inflation - that was just a Western theory - he had been dubbed the worst central banker in the
world.
Far from being a spur to needed reforms, as has been the cases in Mexico, Thailand, and
Korea, in Russia the crisis was taken as an excuse for anti reformers to seize greater power. Clearly
the discipline of the international financial markets and IMF conditionality did not work. Russia is
a large country and it is not surprising that faced with what he likely perceived to be a choice
between proper economic policies and political survival, Mr. Yeltsin chose the latter. If one is
holding onto political power only by a thread, long run economic costs are unlikely to be given15
substantial weight in a political leader's decision calculus. The debt moratorium fits this picture
perfectly. Since private international investment inflows had already temporarily dried up, the
moratorium carried little immediate economic costs while providing substantial relief from short-
term financial pressures. The major economic costs would come later in the form of substantial
delays before the Russian government, banks and firms could return to international financial
markets.
Under Mr. Kirigenko's government, the likely length of time that Russia would be excluded
from international financial markets was a source of concern. When it became clear that initial
plans to favor domestic over international investors in the terms of debt restructuring would likely
freeze out future Russian borrowing abroad for a substantial period, this strategy was shelved.  It
was announced that foreign and domestic lenders would be treated equally. But Mr. Kirigenko's
farsightedness, as limited as it was, proved too much for Mr. Yeltsin to tolerate when he viewed his
political survival to be at stake Kirigenko and his team were fired.
While the Western loans to the Yeltsin government in the summer of 1998 did not work,
making them was not a mistake. Any objective political economy analyst would have to conclude
that the odds were against the strategy working. But the stakes were high. Even a relatively small
probability that Western policy conditional loans would help the reform process was worth a
substantial investment. Given the national defense costs of the Cold war, generous Western
financial support is a drop in the bucket. The 1998 IMF led package was quite substantial, over $22
billion, and it was given at a pivotal time. Critics of IMF and Western government aid to Russia
have argued that it has focused on the wrong objectives and allowed the Russian government to16
delay needed economic reforms. There is some truth to this argument, but the most extreme critics
go much too far when they argue that it would have been better to give no aid at all.
2
Counsels of perfection are often the enemy of good policy. The process of economic and
political reform in Russia has been painfully slow and there have been many steps backwards as
well as forward.  But as poor as the economic policy performance of the Yeltsin government has
been, it has been superior to what would have been pursued by the most likely alternative
governments. It appears likely that the West tended to be overly optimist about the prospects for
substantive reform, but IMF and Western government aid helped support the least worse of a bad
set of alternatives. That is not the type of program one can get very enthusiastic about, but given
the stakes it was worth pursuing.
The July 1998 IMF program came at a critical time.
3 While having brought inflation down
dramatically through tight monetary policies, Russian economic policy had catered far too much to
the interests of the financial and industrial oligarchs. Tax collection remained dismally low and
considerable hardships were being generated by mounting averages in government wage and
pension payments. Privatization and economic restructuring likewise continued to be slowed by an
unholy alliance of the populist attitudes of the communist controlled Duma and the oligarchs'
special interests. Mr. Yeltsin continued to vacillate between supporting reform and catering to
political interests. With his appointment in March 1998 of a cabinet headed by Sergei Kirigenko,
Mr. Yeltsin took a strong step in the direction of reform. At the same time Russia had been hit by
serious adverse international shocks, the drop in oil prices and rise in risk premia on emerging
market debt. It was always uncertain how much of the reforms planned by Mr. Kirigenko's team
                                               
2 See Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickles “Russia’s Virtual Economy,” Foreign Affairs.  September/October 1998 for a
perceptive pessimistic outlook for the prospects for near term Russian reform.
3 On the pivotal nature of the state of the reform process in the summer of 1998 see Grigory Yavlinsky “Russia’s
Phony Capitalism,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 1998.17
would be blocked by the Duma, but it was clear that Messrs. Yeltsin and Kirigenko were making a
major push that deserved to be supported by the West.
The Yeltsin - Kirigenko government, the IMF, and the major Western governments were all
in broad agreement about what needed to be done. So what was the problem? As is so often the
case - the answer lies in domestic politics, both in Russia and the major Western nations.  The
danger that the communist dominated Duma would block key elements of needed reform was
substantial. Thus Russia did not qualify for an IMF loan by normal criteria. Financial support was a
high-risk gamble that should have been made, but not by the IMF!
Saving the IMF
The recent request for additional IMF funding became a focal point for criticism of IMF-US
Treasury policy. With the large-scale programs associated with the Asian crisis, the Fund had
almost run out of lendable money. The Fund did need a quota increase, but the actual amount of
money that the IMF provides in its stabilization programs are not their most important element.
Rather it is the signal that agreement between national and IMF officials on a policy program sends
to the private financial markets.  The Fund serves as a monitor of the seriousness of intentions by
national governments to initiate substantive policy reform and the conditionality of IMF programs
gives governments added incentives to carry through on these intentions. IMF aid is handed out in
installments, and if countries' policies deviate too far from the agreed guidelines, further
installments will be withheld: at least that’s the theory and sometimes practice.
When this strategy is believed to be working, IMF programs unleash private capital flows
that dwarf the magnitudes of direct IMF aid.  But for this crucial monitoring and signaling function
of the IMF to be effective, its programs must be credible.  Everyone expects some slippage from
the announced targets of IMF programs, but if the backsliding is too great, then the credibility of
the IMF’s signal is damaged.  While the Mexican rescue operation was a great success on this18
score, the mixed initial results from the IMF's Asian programs had raised questions in the market
about the credibility of IMF programs. From this standpoint, 1998 was a particularly bad time to
risk further damage to the IMF's credibility. Yet it was clear that there was a good chance that the
oligarch-communist coalition would succeed in blocking important elements of the necessary
reforms in Russia.
Why face the risk of a damaging blow to IMF credibility by lobbying it to make an
essentially political loan? Surely, such a high-risk loan package should be financed directly by the
major Western governments, not the IMF, just as the U.S. had funded post war European economic
recovery through the Marshall Plan.
The answer lies in the strong domestic political opposition to such funding in the major
Western countries.  The Mexican bailout was extremely unpopular in the U.S. Congress and indeed
Congress refused to authorize U.S. funding. The U.S. share of the rescue package ultimately came
from the Exchange Stabilization Fund, which is under the direct control of the Executive. Despite
the success of the peso rescue package, opposition in Congress both to IMF programs and
unilateral financial aid had if anything strengthened since the Mexican crisis. A curious
combination of critics from the far right and the far left almost succeeded in blocking funding of
the U.S. share of the internationally agreed increases in IMF quotas. The Clinton administration
clearly understood that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get the U.S. share of a
G-7 financial aid package for Russia through Congress. Thus political expediency called for
pressuring the IMF to put up the funds instead. This was quite understandable - but it was wrong!
One popular explanation of what went wrong with the IMF program was that it just didn't
put up enough money to handle the situation.  It is true that the IMF loan was not sufficient to
finance all of the debt coming due, but that was never its purpose. It was not just the niggardliness
of Western governments that limited the size of the IMF package. As discussed above, the idea of19
IMF programs is not to be the primary source of financing of balance of payments or government
budget deficits, but to establish the credibility necessary to stimulate private financing. Of course,
establishing such credibility requires that there be sufficient official funds available to handle
emergencies and provide some bridge financing to help cover lags in implementing policy reforms,
but the key to restoring credibility is in the implementation of policy reforms. The conditionality of
IMF programs gives national governments greater incentives to implement economically
necessary, but politically unpopular, policies and signals that the IMF believes that the government
in question has serious intentions of initiating and carrying through such policies.
For the July 1998 IMF program this was the situation with respect to the intentions of the
executive branch of the Russian government, and the announcement of the program was successful
in establishing more favorable private sector expectations. This was reflected in a substantial fall in
interest rates. The key blow to confidence was not external events, but the emasculation of the
government's proposals in the communist controlled Duma. Had the Duma been willing to endorse
a tax program along the lines agreed between Mr. Kirigenko's government and the IMF, there
would have been little trouble in financing the government debt as it came due.
Political conflicts between reformers and populists are nothing new. Indeed they are the
typical case with IMF programs. It is in just such cases that the IMF has greatest leverage. Despite
leftist critiques of the IMF as a big bully dictating terms to weak nations to protect the interests of
the global capitalist class, the IMF in fact has little influence on politically united countries, large
or small. If the country is united behind reform, IMF arm-twisting is unnecessary. If the country is
united against reform, IMF arm-twisting is useless.
It is in strengthening the hand of reforms in politically divided countries that the IMF is
most effective. But the increased leverage given to reforms by IMF programs is not always
sufficient to swing the balance in this favor, and the recent Russian experience is one of these20
cases.  Attention is now being properly focused on possible reforms of the IMF.  While much of the
ideological rhetoric of both the left and the right falls far from the mark, there have been many
mainstream criticisms and proposals that deserve careful attention.
4  Particularly relevant to the
current discussion is the need to offer greater protection to the IMF from politically motivated
manipulation by the major powers and to strengthen the IMF’s ability to enforce its agreements on
policy conditionality.  As critics have noted, IMF officials sometimes tend to become committed to
programs and national governments can exploit this to gain lax enforcement.  The IMF needs both
to beef up its expertise in political analysis and to adopt internal reforms that stiffen its back in
dealing with borrowing countries.  None of this will be easy, but progress can be made.
An Optimistic Outlook for the Future
It’s easy to understand fears that the global financial system is falling apart.  Calls for a new
international financial architecture are multiplying, without consensus on an agenda for action.
That’s not surprising.  There are no quick fixes to the problems of crony capitalism, special interest
politics, and outright corruption that plague so many of the emerging market countries; and
problems of special interests and short time horizons have even been known in our more mature
democracies.
The recent crises highlight the dangers of premature international financial liberalization in
countries where cronyism and moral hazard problems are prevalent.  While there is considerable
disagreement among experts about the best ways to sequence reforms in such conditions, there is
considerable agreement about ways to avoid repeats of the recent disasters.  The big stumbling
block is not a lack of knowledge, but the need to strengthen domestic political systems enough to
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resist the pressures of special interests.  Inevitably the results of reform efforts will be mixed and
further crises will occur from time to time, but there is a good chance that they will not come again
in the massive waves of the past two years.
At the international level, a lot can be done to improve our international financial
architecture.  Better provision of information, greater transparency for the IMF, etc. are useful.
Proposals for international regulation of capital flows are not.  None of the recent crisis has been
caused primarily by unjustified destabilizing speculation.  But neither have international financial
markets been the strong force for international discipline over national financial policies foreseen
by many neo liberal theorists.
5  Too often capital inflows have helped finance budget deficits and
mask underlying financial problems.  International financial markets can fall prey to excessive
optimism as well as excessive pessimism.  Large surges in inflows of financial capital can be
difficult to absorb productively and may increase a country's vulnerability to future outflows.  They
are a legitimate area of concern for government policy makers and at times national measures to
discourage short term inflows may be both desirable and effective.  However, many of the recent
cases of excessive inflows have been generated in large part by governments themselves.
Moral hazard has played an important role.  Beliefs that if things go badly, investors will be
bailed out encourages inappropriate risk taking.  While IMF programs have been fairly criticized
for encouraging moral hazard, most of the moral hazard in the global financial system has been
generated by national governments.  Government debt played little role in the Asian crisis, but it
was central to both the Mexican and Russian crises.  The IMF led bailout of investors in the
Mexican government’s dollar denominated securities undoubtedly contributed to the willingness of
international investors to purchase Russian government bonds despite the horrible shape of Russian
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public finances. This private international funding gave the Russian government more time to get
its finances in order, but sadly, also reduced the pressures to do so.  And it made the crisis much
harsher when it finally came.
The unwillingness of the IMF and Western governments to bail out these investors sent
shock waves through the global financial markets and imposed considerable hardships on many
emerging market countries seeking international funds.  Global financial markets are finally
beginning to return to normal, however, despite the additional shock of the Brazilian crisis.  This
episode has been painful, but as a consequence of the fall in perception of moral hazard in the
system the long term effect is likely to be a much better balanced operation of markets worldwide.
Indeed, rather than extrapolating recent experiences into a vision of an increasingly chaotic
global financial system, I see much calmer waters ahead.  While many combinations of factors
conspired to cause the various crises of recent years, all shared one common characteristic -
adjustably pegged exchange rates.  The recent crises explode the myth that adopting of pegged
exchange rates is a cheap way of promoting domestic discipline. This does sometimes work, but
more often the result is failure - frequently very costly failure.  The popular idea that pegging the
exchange rate is necessary to halt high inflation simply does not stand up to the empirical evidence.
The majority of such efforts have ended in failure.  A brief period of pegging may be useful as a
part of a comprehensive stabilization program, but it has proven extremely difficult to exit from
these pegged periods without terrible bumps.
6
Perhaps the knottiest problem is the asymmetric time profile of costs and benefits from
abandoning a peg.  The resulting depreciation generates immediate economic and political costs
while much of the benefit comes later; so politically there are strong incentives to try to maintain
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the peg just a little longer.  Even regimes that were intended to be operated flexibly grow rigid over
time.  This has occurred for countries as disparate as France, Italy, Mexico, and Russia.  Thus the
adoption of a pegged exchange rate system - unless it’s backed by strong institutional arrangements
such as a currency board - is likely to worsen rather than help control the biases that plague
domestic macroeconomic policy.  Combine this with the one-way speculative option problem in a
world of high capital mobility and pegged exchange rate regimes can become a disaster waiting to
happen.
The major reason for my optimistic prognosis for the future is that over the past several
years most of the more important pegged rate regimes have broken down.  The combination of
pegged exchange rates and high capital mobility can often be too forgiving of initial minor crimes
and misdemeanors.  By failing to give sufficient early warning signals financial markets may
contribute to the escalation of economic misdeeds.  Ultimately the day of reckoning comes, though,
and the resulting crises often levy punishment that seems far too harsh to fit the crime.  The
adoption of more flexible exchange rates for most countries and genuinely fixed rates for those
who score high on the optimum currency area criteria are not panaceas, but they will do much to
dampen the surges in international financial flows that have plagued the 1990s.
                                                                                                                                                          